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Summary findings
In Poland, present policies are aimed at promoting large,  between small and large farms. Then they used Data
mechanized farms over smaller family farms. These  Envelope Analysis  to estimate scale efficiencies.
policies are based on the perception that large farms  The results show that, for the sample of farms
offer real economies of scale. But international evidence  analyzed:
indicates that such large, mechanized farms are generally  *  Large farms are not more efficient than smaller
less efficient and use less labor than small family farms.  farms.
So, van Zyl, Miller, and Parker analyzed the  *  Smaller farms are more labor-intensive than larger
relationship between farm size and efficiency in Polish  farms.
agriculture.  These results have important policy implications for
They used two different methods to do so. First, they  farm restructuring in Poland and other transition
determined differences in total factor productivity  economies facing similar issues and conditions.
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The issue of what  is the most appropriate farm  size to maximize  agricultural
productivity  has an extensiue literature.  In Poland, present policies are aimed  at
promoting  large-scale, mechanized farm8 over smaller family  farms. These policies
are based on the perception  that there are real economies of scale present  that favor
large farms.  But  these perceptions are contrary to international  evidence, which
indicates that a large-scale, mechanized farm  sector is generally inefficient and uses
less labor than sma<l-scale  family farms.  Thus, there is ample motivation for a
detailed analysis  of the farm size-efficiency relationship in Polish agriculture.
Two different methodologies are used to determine  the farm size-efficiency relationship
in two regions of Polan& first, total factor productivity  (1FP) differences between small
and large farm8 are determined; and second,  non-parametric Data Envelope Analysis
(DEA) is used to estimate scale efficiencies.
Despite a history of policies favoring relatively  larger, mechanized farms  in Poland,
the results show that, within the sample of farms  analyzed, (i) large farms are not
more efficient than smaller farms; and (ii) smaller  farms  are relatively more labor
intensive in their mode of prod uction. These results have important  policy
implications  with respect to farm  restructuring  for Poland and other transition
economies facing similar  issues and conditions.
1  The authors wish to thianlk  Alija  Dokurno,  Edmund Lorencowicz,  Henryk Luejan,
Jacek Mizerka,  Jan Wojciechowski  for their assistance. Ham Binswanger,  Jean-Paul Chavas,
Paula Despins, Richard Lacroix,  Jenny Piesse and Colin  Thirtle also provided  useful
contributions  for which the usual dislaimers  apply.International  evidence indicates  that  a large-scale,  mechanized  farm sector ia
generally less efficient, especially when compared  to small-scale family farms.
Although there  may exist real  economies of scale, they are mostly 'false'  because
they are usually  the result  of policies that  favor larger farms  over small farms.  The
relationship  between productivity  and farm size in Polish agriculture  has not been
adequately  investigated.  The issues of whether  larger,  mechanized  farms  are more
economically efficient than  smaller  farms has  not been analyzed in detail. Yet
results  of such an analysis  could yield important  findings for agricultural  policy in
Poland.
This paper,  therefore,  seeks to address  the farm size-productivity  relationship  in
Polish agriculture,  first,  by considering international  empirical  evidence on the farm
size-efficiency relationship  in agriculture.  This is followed by a discussion of Polish
farm structure  and policies of farm restructuring.  Third, an analysis  of the farm
size-efficiency relationship  for two agricultural  regions of Poland  is undertaken
using cross-section farm-level  data. Both total  factor productivity  comparisons
between farm size categories  and  non-parametric  Data Envelope Analysis are used
in the analysis. The paper concludes with  implications  of these  findings for farm
restructuring  in Poland.
International  Experience  On  Economies  Of Scale,  Farm  Size  and
Productivity
Larger farms are often actively promoted over small farms because it is argued that
significant  economies of scale exist in agriculture.  However, the general  consensue
2in the literature  is that  economies of scale do not exist in agriculture,  except under
specific, usually temporary,  circumstances.  Empirical  evidence demonstrates  that
family-type farms  are generally  more efficient and superior  to other types of
farming  because of the way in which labor relations  are organized. Patterns  of
resource  utilization  indicate  that  smaller  farms  use labor and land with  greater
intensity  than  large farms.  These findings  suggest  that  agricultural  policies should
not favor one form of agricultural  production over another.
Economies of Scale in Agriculture
Most of the arguments  for promoting larger  farms  over smaller  ones rely on the
assumption  that  there  are significant  economies of scale in agriculture.  The sources
of economies of scale are said to include: (i) lumpy inputs,  such as farm machinery
and management  skills,  that  can only be utilized  on farms  above a minimum  size;
(ii) advantages  in the credit  market  and in risk  diffusion arising from collateral
associated  with the ownership  of large holdings; and  (iii) processing  plants  that can
realize economies of scale, usually through  wage plantations  (Binswanger  et al,
1995; Johnson  and  Ruttan,  1994).
However, many options  are available  to help smaller  farms  circumvent  the negative
effects of economies of scale: (i) machine rental  can permit  small farmers  to mitigate
the economies of scale advantage  in all but the most time-bound  of operations,  such
as plowing and planting  in dry climates,  or harvesting  where climatic risks are
high; (ii) management  and technical skills can be contracted from specialized
consultants  and advisory services, or can be provided by publicly financed extension
services; (iii) small farmers  may be able to access credit  through cooperatives where
3many farmers may pool their land for use as collateraL  and various sharecropping
arrangement, where the credit risks are shared by farmer and landowner; and (iv) the
coordination problem associated with processing  in plantation crops can be solved at
a relatively low  cost through contract farming.
Although lumpy inputs, credit and risk diffusion, and processing  plants can,
therefore, be important temporary sources of economies  of scale, market solutions
are generally available that can mitigate the effects of the scale economies.  In any
case, the concept  of economies  of scale is problematic in practice. Theoretically,
economies  of scale are defined by a production function that exhibits a more than
proportional increase in output for a given  increase in magnitude of all inputs.
However, there is rarely a situation when an increase in magnitude of some inputs
does not imply a change in the utilization of other factors of production (Peterson
and Kislev, 1991).
The general consensus of researchers who have empirically investigated it is that
economies  of scale do not exist in agriculture, except  under specific  circumstances
(Johnson and Ruttan,  1994;  Peterson and Kislev, 1991).  Chavas and Aliber (1993),
for example, found virtually no scale economies  in dairy production in Wisconsin,
and the limited initial scale economies  they observed were attributable to lumpiness
of certain inputs.
Public policies  that focus resources on supporting large over small farms are
therefore unlikely to be successful  in terms of realizing significant scale economies.
A more appropriate policy  is one that facilitates the formation of markets to enable
4small farmers  to gain access to essential  productive  resources  and to create  a 'level
playing-field" for all agricultural  producers.
Farm Size and Productivity
The apparent  existence of economies of scale has led researchers  to investigate  more
closely the relative  performance  of small  and large farms.  Over the past  three
decades, various  studies  have assessed  the productivities  of farms  of different  sizes.
In general,  these  studies  demonstrate  a higher  level of factor productivity  on small
farms than  on large ones; however, the  studies  often suffered  from methodological
shortcomings  that  have raised  questions  about their  validity. More recent  studies
have attempted  to address  these issues.
Based on Indian  farm management  data from the late  1950s, Sen (1962) observed
an inverse relationship  between farm size and yields per unit area.  Since then,
many articles  have been written  that  have examined this  relationship.  Berry  and
Cline (1979) carried  out a detailed  empirical  investigation  into the relationship
between farm size and productivity  covering data from Brazil,  Colombia, the
Philippines,  (West) Pakistan,  India, and Malaysia.  They conclude that  'the  evidence
presented...  points to systematically  higher land productivity  on small farms than  on
large ones, and to total  factor productivities  that  are at least comparable"  (Berry
and Cline, 1979: 4).
Other  authors  who found that  an inverse  relationship  exists have included: Cornia
(1986), who found a strong  negative correlation  between farm size and factor inputs
and yields per hectare  in 12 out of 15 developing countries  for which he analyses
5farm management  data from FAQ; Bardhan  (1973), who found that  the elasticity  of
output  per acre with respect  to acreage in selected Indian  villages is mostly
negative;  Khusro  (1968), who similarly  found that  if acreage, uncorrected  for its
level of fertility  is taken,  then as acreage increased,  gross output per  acre decreased;
Carter  (1984), who concluded that  the inverse relationship  is due to specific
characteristics  of small farms; and  Kanel (1967), who discovered that  it is not only
output  per acre, but  net return  per manday,  and the ratio  of values  of outputs  to
inputs  that  were negatively  correlated  with farm size.
In Kenya,  a World Bank study  (World Bank,  1983) that  investigated  the higher
efficiency of small versus large farms,  found that  output  per hectare  was 19 times
higher  and employment  per hectare  was 30 times higher  on holdings under  0.5
hectare  than  on holdings over 8 hectares.  At the national  level, this  meant  that  a 10
percent  reduction  in average farm size would increase  output  by 7 percent  and
employment by over 8 percent.  Binswanger  et al  (1995)report similar  results  for
many other countries.  Evidence is also available  at the macro-level, but only in
terms  of physical yields-an  imperfect  indicator of efficiency. Prosterman  and
Riedinger  (1987) using data from 117 countries,  show that  11 of the top 14 countries
in terms  of grain yields per hectare  are countries  in which small-scale,  family
farming  is the dominant  mode of production.
Based  on the observation  that  there  are no significant  economies of scale in
agriculture,  most  studies  that  consider the relationship  between  farm size and
productivity  assume  that  returns  to scale in agriculture  are constant  (Barnum  and
Squire  1978; Berry and  Cline 1979; and Johnson  and Ruttan  1988). In the absence
6of decreasing  returns  to scale some other explanation  of the inverse farm size-
productivity  relationship  must  be sought. Berry  and Cline argue that  "if returns  to
scale for inputs  actually utilized  are constant,  then the crucial determinant  of the
farm size-productivity  relationship  becomes the behavioral pattern  of resource
utilization  by farm size" (Berry and Cline,  1979: 7; italics added).
Resource  Use and  Farm  Size
Closer analysis  of the pattern  of resource  utilization  by farms  indicates  that  smaller
farms use factors of production  with greater  intensity  than  large farms.  On the one
hand,  it is observed that  the apparent  benefits  large farms  enjoy over small farms
with respect  to land and capital  are due mainly  to market  imperfections.  These
imperfections  can be addressed  through  the promotion of markets  to serve small
farms.  On the other hand,  it is observed  that  small farms use labor resources  more
intensively  than  larger  farms.  For example,  Cornia (1985) finds a negative elasticity
for resource inputs  with respect  to land,  and higher land use intensity  on smaller
farms.  For land, it is argued that  large  farms  underutilize  the total  land area  at
their  disposal  by, for example, having  an output  composition that  is more geared to
land extensive  enterprises  (e.g., cattle  or other livestock projects), while smaller
farms  practice  multi-cropping,  which increases  land utilization  and raises  the total
value of output  for a given area of land.
Under  conditions of perfect  competition,  we would expect these differences  to be
equalized  over time. The fact that  they continue  to persist  many years  after being
identified  suggests that  there  are underlying  economic factors that  go beyond
7essentially  technical,  descriptive explanations.  The basis for this  economic analysis
revolves around  the existence  of imperfections  in the markets  for factors of
production  that  result  in small farms  facing a lower effective price for labor and
higher  effective prices for land and capital. This leads to small farms  using more of
the relatively  abundant  factor-labor,  and less of the relatively  scarce factors-land
and capital,  whereas  large farms treat  land as an abundant  resource, and  substitute
capital  for labor.
Land.  Larger farms face an implicit cost for land that  is lower than  its opportunity
cost. This  is due to: (i) the existence of a limited land market  in many developing
countries,  where the ownership  of land changes only slowly over time, and  in some
areas  where  the market  for land is virtually  nonexistent;  (ii) large landowners
sometimes  being absent from their land, so having little  direct  relationship  with the
land, and as a consequence  undervaluing  its merits  as a productive  resource;  (iii)
large farmers  having better  access to credit,  so they can buy land more easily  at
relatively  low, sometimes  negative, real rates  of interest;  (iv) "distress"  sales  that
enable  large landowners  to purchase  land from small farmers  at lower prices, where
land prices do not fully reflect the risks  of parting  with land for small farmers,  who
if they sell must  seek some risky alternative;  and (v) land being held as an  asset or
for prestige  purposes  that  will tend to reduce its productivity.  Barnum  and Squire
(1978: 198) present  results  from their  analysis that  show land is consistently
underused  by large farms,  and they "attribute  this result  to imperfections  in the
land market,  especially the tendency  to treat  land as a non-economic factor in intra-
family transactions".
8Capital.  Larger  farms also face an implicit cost for capital  that  is often lower than
its opportunity  cost. They are often able to gain easier  access to official subsidized
credit  schemes, and obtain capital  at cheap rates  of interest.  These imperfections
are often exacerbated  by macroeconomic policies that  maintain  a strong  exchange
rate,  meaning  that  large farmers  can import capital  equipment  at effectively
subsidized  prices. Small farmers,  by contrast,  lack access to formal credit  markets,
and depend on informal  markets  that  have high real  rates of interest.  Part  of
Feder's  (1985) model relates  to capital  market  imperfections,  where  obtaining
working capital  depends  on the farm size, i.e., on the collateral offered. His model
shows that  under  these conditions  a systematic  relationship  between  farm size and
productivity  exists. This is confirmed by the research  of Carter  and Kalfayan  (1989)
and  Carter  (1994).
Labor.  Small farms  commit more labor to production than  large farms.  This is due
to the existence of a dual labor market.  On small, family labor-based  farms,  each
member  receives a share  of the total  value product of the farm. This means that  an
individual's  wage will be less than  the marginal  product, and closer to the average
product.  Consequently,  an individual  on a family farm will supply more labor at a
lower marginal  value product (with a lower implicit wage rate),  than  would be the
case if the marginal  value product  of labor were being equated  to the market  wage.
In fact, even if marginal  value  product equalization  were to take  place, family
workers  would discount the market  wage due to the uncertainty  of finding work.
None of these situations  apply in the large farm sector, where the marginal  value
9product  of labor will be at least  equal to, and in the case of monopsony power,
greater  than  the market  wage rate  (Chattopadhyay  and Rudha  1976).
The literature  demonstrates  that  family farms  are generally more efficient and
superior  to other types of farming  because of the way in which  labor relations  are
organized  (Berry and  Cline, 1979; Binswanger  et al,  1995; Deininger,  1993; Johnson
and Ruttan,  1994; Lipton,  1993). Family farms  are by definition farms  where the
owner is the operator  and where  the family provides the large  bulk of the regular
labor requirements  throughout  the year. While the definition  of family farms  does
not exclude the hiring of other people, especially  in a part-time  capacity when
related  to seasonal  labor, they tend  not to rely too much on such activity and can
avoid moral hazard  problems because family farm members  typically work side-by-
side with hired labor and can monitor work effort. Hired labor on large farms  is far
harder  to monitor and  may result  in shirking.  The use of less labor as farm size
increases  is well documented  (e.g. Ghose, 1979; Van Zyl et al,  1995).
Also underlying the establishment  and maintenance  of large-scale farmrs is the
misguided perception that  there is a relationship  between modernization,  specifically
mechanization,  and large farms. This has been clarified in the literature  (Johnson and
Ruttan,  1994). Capital intensity  is explained by the substitution  of capital for labor
because of high wages. This substitution  process, brought about by changes in relative
factor prices (Peterson  and Kislev, 1991), indirectly encouraged the formation of
larger farms. It is argued that  machinery permits  farmers to work progressively
larger units  of land (Hayami and Ruttan,  1985). However, a closer examination  of the
application  of capital and machinery in agriculture  suggests that  although the
10number of workers can be increased substantially  without increasing labor
supervision costs with stationary  machinery, in agriculture,  labor and machines are
both mobile, making supervision  expensive and increasing  management  costs. Also,
agricultural  tasks are sequential  in nature  due to the annual  cycle of production; this
limits the opportunities  for specialization and division of labor, which creates few
advantages  to expansion beyond the size of owner-operator  (Brewster,  1950).
Criticsms  of the Findings
Although there  appears  to be strong empirical  evidence supporting  the existence of
a farm size-productivity  relationship,  the basis for this  finding has been criticized.
Barbier (1984) has criticized the use of pooled data.  He finds no set relationship  in
Hoogly district  in West Bengal, and concludes that  'there  does not exist one form of
relationship  but  multiple  forms -inverse  or not -holding  for different  places in
India, along different  size distributions  and  for different  types  of crops". Carter
(1984) has also pointed  out the possibility of multicollinearity  among the
independent  variables,  e.g., soil quality  and  farm size.
Patnaik  (1972) has  criticized the assumption  that  scale and  size are closely and
positively correlated.  Using data from the Farm  Management  Survey in India, she
shows that  inputs  and- outputs  per acre both decline as farm size increases, but  the
opposite is true when scale is considered. The importance  of this  finding relates
mainly to issues of policy, as it can be seen from her  analysis  that  size in itself is not
an adequate  measure  on which to base agricultural  policy. Closely related  to scale is
the issue of technical  change. Deolalikar  (1981), using cross-section regional  data
11from agricultural  censuses  in India, shows that  with technical  change  the inverse
relationship  breaks  down. He points out that  much of the empirical  work on farm
size dates  from before the green revolution.  In West Godavari, for example, in  1958-
60 there  was an inverse relationship  between  size and output  per acre, but  by 1969-
70 this  relationship  had become positive, which he suggests  is due to more intensive
use of fertilizer.  He argues  that  although  labor market  dualism  is important,  with
technical  change the share  of labor in total  output  will decline, and  other current
inputs,  e.g., fertilizer,  will become more important.
Other  writers  (Binswanger et al, 1995) have argued  that  many of the studies  on
farm size suffer from analytical  shortcomings.  For example, studies  often do not
account for differences in land quality  or labor productivity;  they use physical
yields; and they do not account for differences in size and ownership  holding size.
More accurate  measures  of efficiency are based on the difference in total factor
productivity  between  small and large farms,  and the difference in profits  per unit of
capital invested,  net of the cost of family labor. However, if these more appropriate
productivity  measures  are used, the earlier  findings  are reinforced  rather  than
contradicted.  Binswanger  et al (1995) find that:  (i) the productivity  differential
favoring small farms  over large farms  increases with the differences in size, implying
that  it is largest  where inequalities  in landholdings  are the greatest,  in the
relatively  land-abundant  countries  of Latin America  and Africa, and  smallest  in
land-scarce  Asian countries  where farm size distributions  are less equal;  and (ii) the
highest output  per unit area is often achieved not by the smallest  farm size category
12but  by the second smallest  farm size class, suggesting  that  the smallest  farms  may
suffer from diseconomies of scale, e.g., due to severe credit constraints.
Any observed positive relationship  between  farm size and productivity  is the result
of market  imperfections,  and then only when more than  a single market  is
imperfect.  For example, if credit  is rationed  according to farm size, but all other
markets  are perfect, land and labor market  transactions  will produce a farm
structure  that  equalizes yields across farms  of different  operational  size. But if
there  are imperfections  in two markets,  land rental  and insurance,  or credit  and
labor, a systematic  relationship  arises between  farm size and productivity
(Binswanger  et al,  1995).
In countries,  such as Poland,  where  markets  facing small farmers  for any
combination  of factors of production  (e.g., labor, land, credit,  land rental,  insurance)
are often imperfect or missing-at  least  for some farmers  and in general  those who
are small, this  may give rise  to apparent  economies of scale over the short  term.
However, these economies of scale are 'false"  in the sense that  they are only
temporary,  and the result  of deliberate  elimination  of, or restrictions  on factor
markets.'  Where market  development is promoted, economies of scale diminish  and
eventually  disappear.  The issue, thus,  is not to pursue  a farm structure  that  over
the short  term captures  these  benefits, but  over the longer term locks a country into
an inefficient  and inequitable  structure  centering  on large-scale, mechanized  farms,
but  rather  to encourage  more competitive markets.  Over-emphasizing
modernization,  restructuring,  mechanization  and other similar  concepts that  imply
13the use of more capital  to labor than  that  dictated  by economic realities  should be
discouraged.
Structure  and  Size  in  Polish  Agriculture
Polish farm structure  is characterized  by three  distinct  sectors: state  farms,
cooperatives and private  farms  (Table  1).
Table  1:  Agricultural  Landuse  by Major  Sector
(Thousand  hectares,  with  proportion  of total  in  brackets)
Sector  1985  1990  1992
Private farms  14,425  (77%)  14,228  (76%)  14,264  (77%)
State farms  3,509 (19%)  3,490 (20%)  3,304  (19%)
Co-operative  farms  770 (40%)  650(4%)  678 (4%)
Total  18,844  18,720  18,644
Source. Central Statistical Office  (CSO,  1993)
State  Farms
The concentration  of state  farms  varies substantially  between regions.  It is higher
in the west and north  (40 percent  of all farmland)  and lower in the central  and
southern  regions (10-15 percent).  State  farms are generally very large-5,000  to
6,000 hectares  is not uncommon-and  tend to be horizontally  integrated  in groups
of several  large farms,  as well as vertically  integrated  with feed mills, seed farms,
and poultry processing  units  (World Bank,  1990). More than half of state  farms  are
over 1,000 hectares  in size. In  1988, state  farms  produced 19 percent  of farm output
and  marketed  more than  50 percent  of the total  production for some crops, e.g.,
14wheat  and other grains  (CSO, 1988). The level of mechanization  on state  farms  is
higher than  on private  farms.  Although  the average number of tractors  per area  was
similar  at 6.5/100 hectares  in  1991 (Gomula et al, 1991), tractors  on state  farms
generally were much more powerful.  State  farms'  contribution  to rural  employment
is, however,  relatively  lower than  private  farms.  While accounting  for roughly  19
percent  of the agricultural  land, they employed only 10 percent  of the agricultural
workers in  1992 (Wojciechowski, 1994).
At the start  of the economic program  of transition  from a centrally  planned to a
market  economy during the late  1980s, the agricultural  sector in Poland was highly
protected and  subsidized. Subsidies  to producers  in the form of price support  ranged
from 3.4 to 4.8 percent  of GDP in the period 1986 to  1989. This was supplemented
by input  subsidies  of 1.3 percent  of GDP (Wojciechowski, 1994). The state  farm
sector, however, benefited  disproportionately  from the subsidies  (Table 2).
Table  2:  Percentage  Producer  Subsidy  Equivalents,  by Sector  and
Commodity,  1987 (percent)
Sector  Wheat  Rye  Barley  Beet  Seed  Pork  Beef  Milk
State  67.4  69.3  75.2  49.7  69.0  36.6  3.9  41.1
Private  47.1  48.1  58.7  31.0  43.5  28.1  3.9  22.7
Source:  Foreign Trade Institute (1989)
State  expenditures  were reduced  dramatically  and farm subsidies were abruptly
terminated  when the state  experienced  a fiscal crisis with the collapse of central
planning.  Subsidies  for price support  to farmers  declined from more than  4.0 to 0.2
percent  of GDP from 1989 to 1990. Similarly,  agricultural  input  subsidies  fell from
161.3 to 0.3 percent  of GDP. State  farms,  the major beneficiaries  of agricultural
subsidies,  were thus  left without  support  and had  to adjust to the new conditions of
the market  (Wojciechowski, 1994).
This situation,  as well as a deterioration  of overall economic conditions, e.g., high
inflation,  the limited  availability  of capital  and increased  costs of inputs,  resulted  in
many state  farms being unable to meet their  financial commitments.  The level of
inputs  on state  farms  almost halved between  1990 to 1992, while the use of
fertilizer  fell even further  (CSO, 1993). Lower levels of investment  and input  use
were  accompanied by extensification  of crop and  animal production.  For example,
cereals  replaced more intensive  crops, such as sugar  beet or potatoes
(Wojciechowski, 1994). The drought  of 1992 worsened  the financial plight  of state
farms  (Institute  of Agriculture  and Food Economics, 1994).
As a result  of the fiscal squeeze, the state  farm sector and most individual  state
farms  have run  at a loss since 1991. A change in the accountancy  system  allowed
this loss to be explicit in farms'  financial  statements  (Kondraszczuk  et al, 1992). By
June  1990, 70 percent  of state  farms  had lost their credit-worthiness.  By the end of
1993, state  farm liabilities  were in excess of 18 billion PZL (APA, 1994). There  was,
thus,  a clear need for restructuring  the state  farm sector, and the Agriculture
Property  Agency (APA) was therefore  established  on January  1, 1992 to privatize
state-owned  agricultural  land.
16State Farm  Restructuring
The Polish Government's financial capacity is presently limited, and funds are not
available to continue to subsidize agriculture. On the contrary, the Government
expects to receive  revenues from the proceeds of the privatization of state
agricultural land and assets. While the privatization process was perceived  to be
well on track in most sectors by the early 1990s, the privatization of state farms had
encountered major difficulties (APA,  1994).
APA was set up as an agency of the Treasury, but acts as an independent entity. It
thus has characteristics of both a bureaucratic and private organization. It does not
receive direct government assistance, but has to rely on loans from the financial
sector and proceeds (rents and sales) from assets under its control. All state
agricultural land is being transferred to APA  with the objective  of privatizing it as
soon as possible. However, a major impediment to this process is that when APA
takes over a farm, it also assumes responsibility for all outstanding debt, which
averages nearly 50 percent of the market value of all farm assets. This debt has to
be serviced from the proceeds of the farm, through either the privatization of assets
or the returns to farming, or some  combination (APA,  1994).
Despite this difficulty,  APA has achieved considerable  progress in its first two years
of operation (1992-1993):  (i) an action program has been prepared to restructure,
transfer, privatize or close  down agro-processing  enterprises on state farms-
liquidation of non-agricultural property has proceeded  faster than liquidation of
farms; (ii) it has completed the take-over of the majority of farms, and began the
17transfer  process for the remaining  ones; and (iii) it has  privatized  more than  35
percent  of the former state  agricultural  land  through  lease, sale or give-away.
APA uses four basic processes  to privatize  state  land it acquires  (APA, 1994; World
Bank,  1994):
•  Land sale  is regarded  as the preferred  manner  of privatization.
Reprivatization  claims of former owners present  problems with land sales, as
does the lack of finance on the part  of buyers,  which restricts  the number of
buyers.
*  Leasing  of land requires  less money and is quick to execute. It also allows
for easy sub-division  of large farms.  In general,  however, farmers  need
outside  financial help to meet obligations  as proceeds from the farms  do not
provide sufficient revenue.  Individual  farmers  are used to having ownership
rights  and do not easily accept leasing  as a contractual  form governing
landuse.  However, APA does its best  to make the lessees  feel secure on the
land.
*  Company  agencies  are limited  special agencies formed in cooperation with
the Ministry of Agriculture  to manage  both animal  and plant  breeding farms.
In general, the operational  assets  are transferred  to the company, but  not the
.land, which is leased. These companies  are wholly owned by APA.
*  Management  contracts  are similar  to leasing.  However, the manager  does
not farm for his own account, but  works for the APA. In general,
management  contracts  are used when there  is no possibility  of leasing.
18Thus, a satisfactory  procedure already  exists for transferring  ownership  of state
farms.  However, the privatization  process has been handicapped  by a number of
practical  and policy issues. More than  four-fifths of the land already  privatized  is
being leased, while only five percent  has been sold (Miller and Wojciechowski,
1994). Reasons for this  imbalance  include: insufficient  private  resources  to buy land;
low profitability  of agriculture;  administrative  constraints  with respect  to land
registration;  land reprivatization  claims; and institutional  and political  constraints
to more rapid land sales-strong  pressure  to sell state  assets  not too cheaply with
prices based  on non-market  or book values rather  than  on market  values;
perceptions  that  future  competitiveness  of Polish agriculture  requires  large areas
under  single control so as to allow for economies of scale; and internal  concerns at
APA regarding  its long term  role and the tenure  of personnel.  As a result,
transformation  is not popular across the entire  political  spectrum  in Poland,
particularly  as it reveals hidden unemployment.
Moreover, the farm size issue has  also not been resolved satisfactorily.  In general,
APA is in favor of smaller  farms  and acknowledges the superiority  of family farms
(Tanski,  1994). However, the prevailing  opinion is that  specific circumstances  in
Poland, enable  large, mechanized  farms  to cope better  financially,  especially with
respect to input  and output  marketing.  Reasons  given for this  advantage  include:
the quality of existing infrastructure  on farms; the policy environment;  the lack of
access to European  Community markets;  the concentration  in agro-processing; and
the collapse of agro-services and transportation  difficulties.2
19The belief in the superiority  of large-scale  mechanized  farms under  these conditions
is also borne out by the reluctance  to restructure  state  farms by creating  farms  of
less than  200 hectares  in size. State  farms  average  about 2,300 hectares  in size,
while the average  parcel of land offered for privatization  by APA is generally 600
hectares-far  higher than  the average private  farm size. Thus,  although  the
privatization  of state  farms  is accompanied  by some restructuring  into smaller
units,  these new farms maintain  the general  characteristics  of large-scale
mechanized  farms.  Moreover, criteria  for business  plans  on which the restructuring
is based accentuate  modernization  and mechanization  (APA,  1994).
Private  Farms
Polish agriculture  never underwent  complete collectivization. The dominant  private
sector mainly consists  of small farms.  Only 8 percent  of private  farms  are larger
than  15 hectares,  yet they cultivate  24 percent  of the total  of private  farmland
(Table 3).
Table  8:  Private  Farm structure  in Poland,  1991
Category  Size  Number  |  Area  Average size
(Hectares)  (Thousand)  (Percent)  (Million.  (Percent)  (Hectares)
hectares)
Small  < 5  1,108  48.7  2.7  19.9  2.4
Medium  5-10  692  30.4  4.4  32.4  6.4
Large  > 15  183  8.0  3.3  24.3  18.0
Source:  Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics  (1990);  World Bank (1991)
The Polish Government  has sought  to promote  a long-term  policy of land
consolidation  in an attempt  to restructure  agriculture.  Between  40,000 to 60,000
20hectares  of privately-owned  farmland  were consolidated annually.  While the
principal  effect has been on middle-sized commercial farms  that  depend largely  on
farming  for a living, the smallest  farms  have also been targeted.  Farms,  ranging in
size from 5-15 hectares,  are declining in number  as they are consolidated  either
with  official financial  support,  bought by larger  farms (over 15 hectares),  or
purchased  by the State  in exchange for a pension.  Until  1989, land consolidation
was also fostered by restricting  access to inputs,  operating  and development  credit,
and extension  services; by encouraging  older farmers  to retire  and sell their  land in
exchange for a pension; and by deliberately  not producing the appropriate  size
machinery  for smaller  farms.  The overpowered equipment  used on medium-size
Polish farms  is particularly  noticeable  (Report of the Polish Task Force,  1990).
Analyzing  the  Farm  Size  -Efficiency  Relationship  in  Polish
Agriculture
The issue of optimal farm size remains unresolved  in Poland. Promotion of larger
farms  is based on the perception that  there  are real economies of scale present  in
Polish  agriculture  that  favor large farms  over smaller  family farms. But  these
perceptions  are contrary  to international  evidence, which indicates that  a large-scale,
mechanized farm sector is generally inefficient, especially when compared to small-
scale family farms. No study has, however, been carried out to date that  adequately
analyzes the relevance of the farm size-productivity relationship  in Polish agriculture.
There is, thus,  ample motivation for a detailed analysis that  should allow for an
evaluation of the present  policies of small farm consolidation and state farm
restructuring.
21There is a paucity of accurate farm-level data on the performance of large-scale,
mechanized farms, both state-owned  and private.  The old state farms  are in a state of
neglect with many facing bankruptcy.  Newly privatized farms have not been in
operation  long enough to justify analysis. Therefore, the analysis in this paper utilizes
data on existing private farms to investigate  the farm size-efficiency relationship.
Two different  methodologies are used to determine  the farm size-efficiency
relationship  in two regions of Poland: first, total factor productivity (I'FP) differences
between small and large farms  are determined;  and second, non-parametric  Data
Envelope Analysis (DEA) is used to estimate  scale efficiencies. These two approaches
to determining  efficiency are complementary. TFP provides a measure  of overall
productivity, but does not analyze the contribution of different sources of efficiency.
By contrast,  DEA isolates scale efficiency from technical and allocative efficiency.
Both approaches meet the requirements  for appropriate  methodologies to measure
farm productivity covered in Binswanger  et al (1995).
Data
Surveys  conducted by the Institute  of Agricultural  and Food Economics (IAFE) in
Warsaw,  Poland  provided the data  for the analysis.  IAFE conducts these  surveys
every year, but  in this  paper only 1993 data  were used. In 1993, 736 private  farms
were surveyed.  For these surveys, Poland was divided into nine relatively
homogeneous regions. However, the analysis  in this paper uses data  from only two
of these regions: Region 1 is represents  the  area around  the capital  of Warsaw-
22Stoleczny; and Region 8 represents  the mid-west of Poland-Srodkowo-Zachodni
(Table 4).
Table  4:  Surveys  Included  in  the  Farm Size-Efficiency  Analyses
Region  Predominant  Year Covered  Number of
Type  of Farming  by Survey  Farms
Surveyed
Region  1:  Mixed  farming:  1993  97
Stoleczny  Grain, livestock
Region  8:  Mixed  farming:  1993  151
Srodkowo-Zachodni  Grain, livestock
The sample  of farms  in each region was selected according to specific criteria,  for
example farms  smaller  than  three  hectares  were excluded and only progressive
farmers  were selected. The selection within  these criteria  is random.  However, due
to this  procedure  the sample does not represent  the actual  structure  of farming  and
the size distribution  of farms  in the regions  surveyed. Typical farms  included in the
sample  are generally  more market  oriented  and have higher  productivity  than
average  farms.  In 1993, the productivity  of those farms  was on average more than
40 percent  higher than  for the  average farm.
Data were collected on-farm by using a Farm  Record Book that  covers the following:
(i) cash transactions  (trade);  (ii) credit transactions  (trade) and  reconciliations;  (iii)
trade  of crops, animal  and processed products;  (iv) monthly work of family and hired
labor (hours); (v) disposal of own machinery  and custom hire (hired machinery);  (vi)
farm inventory  and changes;  and (vii) description  of farm (personal data,  location of
farm, cropping structure,  taxes  and insurance  paid, farmer's  intentions  and goals,
23etc.). This information  was then processed  following internationally  accepted
accounting practices  to develop balance sheets,  income and cash-flow statements.
These  data  are generally of good quality  and have been used in several  analyses
(Miller et al, 1994; Polish-American  Extension  Project,  1995).
The final data  for each farm in the different  samples  used in the analysis involve
inputs  and outputs.  These were aggregated  to give two output  series-crops  and
livestock-and  seven input series-land,  buildings, livestock and  machinery
representing  the stock inputs,  and crop-specific (seed, fertilizer),  livestock-specific
(feed, dips) and other  inputs  (electricity, etc.) representing  flows (Table 5).
Table  5: Summary  Size  Characteristics  of Farms  Analyzed
Variable  Repon 1:  Stolecn  Regio 8: Srodkowo-Zachodni
___Average  Maximum  Minimum Average  Maximum  Minimum
Farm Size:
Actual size  (ha)  12.87  63.88  3.56  14.69  101.53  3.19
Quality-adjusted  (ha)  13.87  44.66  1.44  14.71  82.44  2.36
Output:
Crops (PLN)  8,366  19,671  1,365  13,664  82,990  2,215
Livestock  (PLN)  7,906  24,512  134  12,472  54,140  0
Stock Inputs:
Land (PLN)  16,737  52,278  2,311  20,746  131,901  3,769
Buildings  (PLN)  29,076  102,076  4,076  22,324  86,983  1,475
Livestock  (PLN)  5,505  20,371  12  6,714  26,467  0
Machinery  (PLN)  29,353  118,851  2,412  20,814  116,896  399
Flow Inputs:
Crop  inputs (PLN)  1,701  6,514  310  3,286  24,338  747
Livestock  (PLN)  4,099  13,255  93  7,158  30,310  2
Other inputs (PLN)  1,474  4,072  201  2,144  7,062  367
The data from these surveys specifically allow for the elimination  of the problems
with earlier studies.  In particular,  farm size has been adjusted  for differences in land
quality  within regions by using the land classification  system  and land tax
coefficients. 3 This methodology is commonly used in Poland  to normalize land
24areas.4 In this  paper all land is quality-adjusted  and expressed  in terms of Land
Class IV equivalents.
Another  important  point is that,  within  a specific region, all farmers  face essentially
the same sets  of prices because they buy from the same input suppliers  and output
markets  for most commodities were controlled. This implies that  monetary  values of
outputs  and inputs  (revenues and costs in the relevant  categories) can be treated  as
quality  adjusted  quantities, 5 which greatly  enhances  the reliability  of the analysis
as it also normalizes  input and output  quantities  by eliminating  the effect of quality
differences.
All analyses were  conducted separately  for each region or survey. Because the
analysis  implicitly neglects possible production  uncertainty,  e.g., due to weather
effects, the underlying  assumption  is that  all farmers  within  each survey face
similar  production  uncertainty.  This seems to be appropriate  given that  the analysis
is conducted for a given production  year and covers one relatively  homogeneous
region at a time.
Total  Factor  Productivity  Measures
Total factor productivity  (TFP) for different  farm size categories is a superior
indicator  of the farm size-efficiency relationship  compared  to partial  indicators,
such as physical  output  or value of agricultural  output per unit  of operated  area,  as
it accounts fully for differences in labor and other input  use. All quantity
measurements  used in the TFP analysis were annual  flow variables.  Stock variables
were transformed  into flow variables  by calculating  the equivalent  annuities  based on
25the relevant interest  rate for that  period and region, the average useful life of the
particular  assets,  and the applicable tax rate.6 Thus, the analysis presented  measures
all inputs  and outputs  as annual flows expressed  in monetary terms.
Private Total Factor Productivity Analysis
TFP values  for different  farm size categories have been calculated  and compared  for
each of the farm surveys (Table 6). The most efficient farm was used as the
reference point for calculating  the Tornquist-Theil  Index, which yields a
comparative  TFP index.7 The methodology for constructing  the TFP index is
described in detail in Thirtle  et al (1993).
Table  6:  Relative  Total  Factor  Productivity  and  Labor/Machinery  Indices,
by Farm  Size
Region  /  Item  Farm Size  ectares|
<5  5-10  10-15  >15
Region 1: Stoleezny
Total Factor  Productivity*  138.4  140.2  147.0  100.0
Labor/Machinery  Ratio*  118.3  127.1  139.7  100.0
Region 8: Srodkowo-Zachodni
Total Factor  Productivity*  111.6  110.7  121.7  100.0
Labor/Machinery  Ratio*  126.8  131.4  125.5  100.0
Notes:  * TFP index and labor/machinery  ratio of large farms (>15  ha) are the norms
(100)  against which the other size categories  were compared.
Analysis  indicates  that  the differences in both TFP and labor/machinery  ratios
between  the farm size categories smaller  than  15 hectares  and larger  than  15
hectares  are statistically  significant  at the  10 percent  level, while differences
between the farm size categories smaller  than  15 hectares  are not statistically
26significant  at the 10 percent  level (Table 6). The finding yields a downward  sloping
curve for TFP with  respect to farm size (Figure  1).
Within the sample of farms  analyzed, the results  are clear: (i) large farms  are not
more efficient than smaller  farms,  particularly  those within the 10-15 hectares
range; and  (ii) smaller  farms  have a larger  labor/machinery  ratio than  large farms,
indicating  that  they are relatively  more labor intensive  in their  mode of production.
Figure  1: Relative  Total  Factor  Productivity  per farm  size in  the  Stoleczny
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Social Total Factor Productivity  Analysis
Using market  prices to measure  productivity  assesses  differences in private
efficiency, while the use of social opportunity  costs as a measure  eliminates  the
impact of distortion  and measures  differences in social efficiency. Few studies,  none
of them in Poland,  has made this  distinction  in the analysis  of the farm size-
efficiency relationship.  In the period under  consideration,  the price of capital  was
distorted  by several factors, including  tax benefits  and interest  rate  subsidies.  This
27contributed,  amongst  other things,  to over-capitalization  of larger  farms  relative  to
smaller  ones (Table 6); output  prices were also distorted  due to protection  and
market  price support,8 with larger  farms benefiting  disproportionately.  Accounting
for these  distortions  is thus important  when looking at farm structure  and
production  relations  from a social perspective.
To account for these distortions,  social efficiency estimates  were calculated  for
farms in the two samples. Social opportunity  costs for capital,  labor, variable farm
inputs  and farm outputs  (both crops and livestock) were obtained  from previous
studies  and verified through  discussions with  government  officials and World Bank
staff. The TFP analysis of each farm was repeated  using these social opportunity
costs rather  than  private  costs (Table 7).
The results  obtained  from the social TFP analyses  suggest that:  (i) average  social
TFP is lower than  average  private  TFP in both regions; and (ii) large  farms  (> 15
hectares)  are more inefficient relative  to smaller  farms  when social opportunity
costs are taken  into account.
The reason  large farms  are more inefficient  stems  mainly from differences  in the
relative  importance  of labor and capital  in the input  mix of large and small  farms.
The value of output of small and large farms  is generally affected in a similar
manner  because the ratio of livestock to crops does not differ significantly  between
these  groups, but  the input  mix varies considerably,  with large farms  being
relatively  more capital  intensive  and small farms  being relatively  more labor
intensive.  Because the social opportunity  cost of labor is lower than  the actual wage
28rate  due to high rural  unemployment,  but the social opportunity  cost for capital  is
higher  than  the actual prices farmers  face, the total value of inputs  increases  more
for large farms than  for small farms.
Table  7:  Social  Relative  Total  Factor  Productivity  by Farm  Size
Region  Farm Size  Average
(Htares  _)  Social/Private
< 5  6  5-10  10 - 15  > 15  TFP Ratio
;Reegn 1: Stoleczny  145.8  150.4  159.6  100.0  0.87
Reion 8: Srodkowo-Zachodni 120.4  121.9  131.2  100.0  0.89
Notes:  *  Four farm size categories  were defined for each dataset.
**  TFP index and labor/machinery  ratio of large farms (>15  ha) are the
norms (100)  against which the other size categories  were compared.
The results  of the social TFP analysis  should be interpreted  with care. Farmers
react  to the incentive structure  facing them, and if capital is relatively  cheaper,  they
use more of it, and  vice versa.  For this  reason  the social TFP calculations  are more
indicative  of the distortions  than  the actual social costs or efficiency losses.
Changing the values from private  to social prices strictly  does nothing  to the
physical  input  and output  ratio,  and TFP stays essentially  the same, although  the
weighting  of the inputs  and outputs  change. However, the point here is to determine
to what  an extent  farm size influences  the farmer's  ability to capture  benefits  and
utilize  the incentive structure.
29Non-parametric  EiTiciency Estimation  Using Data  Envelope  Analysis
(DEA)
The analysis of efficiency  has fallen into two broad categories: parametric and non-
parametric. The first approach relies on a parametric specification  of the production
function, cost function or profit function (Forsund et al, 1980;  Bauer, 1990).
Alternatively, production efficiency  analysis can rely on non-parametric methods
(Seiford  and Thrall, 1990).  Building on the work of Farrell (1967)  and Afriat (1972),
the non-parametric approach has the advantage of imposing no a priori parametric
restrictions on the underlying technology  (Fare et al, 1985).  It can also easily handle
disaggregated inputs and multiple output technologies.  As the non-parametric
approach develops,  its applications for production analysis have become  more
refined (Chavas and Aliber, 1993),  thus providing  new opportunities for empirical
analysis of economic  efficiency.
Non-parametric scale efficiency  (SE) measures were developed  in response to the
earlier work on technical efficiency  (TE) and allocative efficiency  (AE) (Baumol  et al,
1982).  While  TE and AE take the output level as given, SE is concerned  with
choosing  the output level itself. The key question becomes  whether firms are
operating under decreasing, increasing, or constant returns to scale (CRTS).  SE
takes on values between 0 and 1, where SE=1 identifies scale efficiency  under (local)
CRTS.  Finding SE<l means that the firm is not scale efficient, i.e., does not produce
at a scale.exhibiting local CRTS.  In this context, (1-SE)  can be interpreted as the
relative decrease in average cost obtainable from rescaling outputs to the point of
(locally)  CRTS.
30The fDrmulation  of the non-parametric  programming  problem for this analysis is
based on the work of Chavas and Aliber (1993)  and is therefore not repeated in its
entirety. Essentially, data envelope  analysis (DEA)  uses a linear programming
procedure to minimize  inputs per unit of output to determine the frontier of best-
practice farms, and then to determine the efficiency  of all the production units relative
to the frontier. This estimation approach  is preferred to econometric  modeling  where
the techniques impose  a functional form, and having zeros  for some  inputs can cause
problems  (Nunamaker, 1985;  Ali and Seiford,  1993).
The non-parametric  Farrell technical efficiency  measure is defined as the locus of the
efficient points using the minimum required inputs to produce  the unit level of output.
The efficiency  of the other farms is measured relative to this isoquant (Figure 2).
Figure  2:  Farrel  Efficiency  Measurement
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The efficiency  frontier unit isoquant is determined by the linear combination  of just
two efficient farms, B and C, and is labeled Y*.  The efficiency  of a farm such as A,
that is not on the frontier, is measured by the ratio OD/OA,  since OD is the vector
31representing  the lowest mix of inputs  that  farm A could use and still reach the
isoquant,  using its own factor combination.
Efficiency measures  for the Polish data provide an assessment  of aggregate,  total
efficiency, and include both technical  and  scale effects. As our interest  is primarily
on the farm-size-efficiency  relationship,  it is important  to separate  out the effects
of farm size on efficiency (Figure 3). The effect of this decomposition is covered by
Fare  et al (1985), while Piesse et al (1995) and Van Schalkwyk  et al (1993) provide
empirical  applications.
CRTS technology is denoted by the linear  total  product curve, OP, from the origin,
through  the efficient production units  B and C. Units A and D, in this  example, are
inefficient  as they are below the CRTS frontier.  When non-constant  returns  to scale
are allowed for, the frontier  (ABCD) is concave, and the input-output  combinations
A, B, C and D are all technically efficient.
Figure  3: Decomposition  of Technical  and  Scale  Efficiency
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32When technical  efficiency is extracted  from total  efficiency, only the scale effect
remains.  Thus, farm A is scale inefficient  by OX/OX', due to being too small, but is
technically  efficient. Farm  D is similarly  technically efficient, but is too large  and is
scale inefficient by OX*'/OX". Finally,  farm E is technically inefficient  by OX'/OX'
and  scale inefficient by OX/OX', giving a total level of inefficiency, relative  to the
CRTS frontier,  of OX/OX'.
Results
DEA analysis  has been used to estimate  the farm size-efficiency relationship  in
Poland  for the data  described earlier.9 In particular,  the scale efficiency of each of
the farms  is determined  relative  to that  of all other farms in the same region
(Table 8).
Table  8: Average  Technical  and  Allocative  Efficiency  Results
by Different  Farm  Size  Categories
(1.00 = Efficient)
Efficiency  Region  <  6ha  5-lOha  |10-  15ha  >  16  ha
Technical  Region  1  1.000  0.971  0.981  0.939
CIE)  Region  8  1.000  0.980  0.980  0.955
Scale  Region 1  0.996  0.982  0.983  0.971
(SE)  Region  8  0.994  0.966  0.999  0.982
AMocative  Region  1  0.735  0.728  0.741  0.724
(AE)  Region  8  0.788  0.815  0.804  0.790
Total  Region 1  0.732  0.694  0.689  0.660
(TE*SE*AE)  Region  8  0.783  0.771  0.787  0.741
33The results  are, to some extent,  similar  to those obtained  with the TFP analyses.
Large farms  (>15 hectares)  are in general less efficient than  smaller  farms  (<15
hectares).  However, the results  of the different  efficiency measure  are mixed.
Insignificant  differences between  mean farm sizes of scale efficient  (SE-eff) and
inefficient  (SE-ineff) farms  (p<0.10) were obtained  for both regions,  as well as for
the different  farm size categories.  The results  for allocative efficiency (AE) were
similar,  yielding no significant  differences  (at the 10 percent  level). On the other
hand,  large farms  (>15 hectares)  were significantly  (p < 0.10) less technically
efficient than  smaller  farms.
The reason  for the perceived inconsistency  between the results  obtained  with the
TFP and the DEA methodology may be attributed  to the inherent  differences in the
methodology. DEA isolates scale efficiency from technical  and allocative efficiency,
while TFP measurements  do not differentiate  between  them.
The conclusions from the DEA analysis  with respect  to scale are: (i) differences
between  scale efficiency for large farms  (>15 hectares)  and smaller  farms  (< 15
hectares)  are not significant;  (ii) large farms  (> 15 hectares)  are technically
significantly  less efficient than  smaller  farms; and (iii) total efficiency (SE*TE*AE)
of large farms  (>15 hectares)  is does not differ significantly  from that  of smaller
farms.
The inverse of the scale efficiency measure  (1/SE) has been investigated  by plotting
it against  quality-adjusted  farm size to present  visually  scale efficiency (Figure 4).
Following Chavas  and Aliber (1993), this  inverse can be interpreted  as something
34akin to an average cost function, i.e., it is a declining  function of outputs under
increasing returns  to scale (IRTS)  and an increasing function of outputs under
decreasing returns  to scale (DRTS).  Initially, efficiency  increases as farm size
increases, depicted by the down-sloping  section of the curve for farm sizes less than
10 hectares. This is followed  by horizontal section in the curve where scale efficiency
is at its highest. Eventually scale efficiency  decreases again as farm size become
larger than 20 hectares. From the figure it appears that the optimal farm size in the
Srodkowo-Zachodni  Region  of Poland seems to be in the range of 10-20  hectares.
Figure  4:  Inverse  Scale Efficiency  Per Farm  Size in the Srodkowo-
Zachodni  Region of Poland,  1993.
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Conclusions  and  Implications  for Farm  Restructuring
Despite a history of policies  favoring relatively larger, mechanized  farms in Poland,
the results show that, within the sample of farms analyzed,  (i) large farms are not
more efficient  than smaller firms, particularly those within the 10-15  hectares
range; and (ii) smaller farms have a larger labor/machinery ratio than large farms,
indicating that they are relatively more labor intensive in their mode of production.
35These results  are in accordance with  empirical  evidence on the farm size-efficiency
relationship  elsewhere  in the world. It is somewhat surprising,  however, that  the
range  of scale-efficient  farms is relatively  small. General experience  indicates  that
inefficiencies usually  set in after  a much wider range of optimal farm sizes.
These results  have important  policy implications  with respect  to farm restructuring
for Poland  and other transition  economies facing similar  issues and conditions.  The
results  imply that  there  will be no efficiency losses if large mechanized  farm8 are
restructured  into smaller  units.  On the contrary,  there  may well be some efficiency
gains.  Moreover, such a process will lead to more labor intensive processes that  will
be beneficial in an environment  where  unemployment  and capital  scarcity  are
severe constraints  to production. It also illustrates  that  the consolidation  present
policy of consolidating  small farms into larger  units  should be reconsidered.  The
results  suggest  that  the most appropriate policies are those that 8upport a flexible
farm  structure  with a range of farm sizes where market factors and  managerial
ability determine  individual  size preferences.
An important  element  in the promotion of such a flexible structure  is to get the
system of incentives  right. This implies the removal of policies and distortions
favoring  larger farms  over smaller farms.  The basic principle  should be to make
markets  work by removing distortions  and privileges  favoring large farms,  and
creating  markets  to service small farmers  in areas where  they are missing.  This
should be done without  entrenching  new privileges. Imperfect  markets  should be
encouraged  to work better.
36Notes
l  Under certain circumstances, such as those in Poland, there are external ecdnomies
of scale (Johnson and Ruttan, 1994). These occur when firms or farms, as they increase in
size, experience advantages in terms of access  to inputs, credit, services, storage facilities, or
marketing and distribution opportunities relative to smaller farms. This gives large farms
real advantages relative to small farms  due to pecuniary economies or policy distortions
rather than to greater efficiency.  On the other hand, diseconomies  of scale may also occur,  for
example when the labor market fails or do not exist, when transaction coats in the labor
market are high, or when the effort of hired labor is significantly  affected  by supervision (De
Janvry, 1987).
2  See Guba et al  (1995) and Wei et al (1995) for recent developments in input and
output markets.
a  The land classification  system distinguishes between six different classes of land for
arable land  and  pastures.  The land  tax  coefficients, which were  used to  compare and
normalize the different land dasses are: Class I = 1.8; Class II =1.5; Class III = 1.3, Illa  and
-IIb have values of 1.25 and 1.35, respectively; Class IV = 1.0, IVa and  Vb have values of
1.05 and 0.95, respectively; Class V = 0.8; and  Class VI = 0.5. The normalized land area
adjusted for quality is expressed in land class IV equivalents.
4  The  normalized,  quality  adjusted  land  area  is  expressed  in  Land  Class  IV
equivalents. However, there has been some recent criticism against the use of the land tax
equivalents based on the land dassification system as this does not in all cases accurately
reflect the real value and production potential of land (Kazimierz,  1986).  However,  for lack of
any other acceptable methodology,  this was applied in this study to adjust for land quality
37differences.  Testing  the  results  by  applying  the  Delphi  technique  shows  that  this
methodology is appropriate  for the two cases/regions under  consideration.
5  This  amounts  to assuming  that  the  corresponding  implicit price  indexes  are  unity.
This approach  has  the advantage  of being empirically tractable.  Although  it allows for price
variation  across years and  areas, it has the disadvantage  of neglecting  price variations  across
farms  within any  particular  survey. While the intuition  is that  these  variations  are  small or
even  negligible, they  cannot be ruled  out. The "rule  of one price" (Chavas  and Aliber,  1993)
does, for  example,  not take  into account different  transaction  costs or market  failures.  The
assumption  that  all farmers  within  a survey  face the  same prices seem to reasonable  given
the nature  of the farm  support  system in these  areas. An additional,  but related  point is that
the  "rule  of one  price"  implicitly  accounts  for  commodities  that  are  not  of homogeneous
quality.  Different  farmers  may  face different  prices  because  they  purchase  inputs  or  sell
outputs  of different  quality. By using  the monetary  values of input  and output  as quantities,
there  is an adjustment  for these  quality differences.
6  To convert  the  stocks, namely  land,  buildings,  livestock and  machinery,  into annual
flows, discount rates  for these inputs  based  on the  economic rate of depreciation  (10 years for
machinery  and  25 years for buildings), the  interest  rate  on the  relevant  annuities,  and  the
pertinent  tax rate  were all calculated  and multiplied  by the market  value  of each asset.  The
Jorgensen  approach  was  used  to determine  the  cost  of capital  for  the  conversions  of the
stocks to annual  flows.
7  See  Ball,  Bureau  and  Butault  (1994)  for  a  review  of  the  properties  and
recommendations  on the  selection of different  index  numbers  based  on the  axiomatic  and
economic approaches.  Following from this,  the  Tornquist-Theil  methodology is  appropriate
for this  analysis.
388  See World  Bank (1990; 1991)  for a synopsis of these policies  and their effects.
9  The  non-parametric analysis  of efficiency benefited from discussions with  and
suggestions by Jean-Paul Chavas from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.  He developed
the inital  GAMS  code  for the analysis.
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